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T
he Western Indian Ocean region
is at a critical juncture. Maritime
security threats are on the rise.
The region
1
has become a major drug
smuggling route.
2
Human trafficking,
trade in small arms and ammunition,
wildlife and fishery crime are also
prevalent.
3
The threat of Somali-based
pirates, who hijacked nearly 200 ships
in recent years,
4
has been contained for
the moment. No international merchant
ship has been hijacked successfully
since May 2012.
5
However, the pirates’
organisational structures remain
intact and the piracy risk prevails.
6
The
Western Indian Ocean is also a region
of instability. According to data from the
Fragile States Index, the average fragility
of littorals is among the top third of the
world – ranked 62/63 of 195 states.
7
Most
troubling is the fact that of the Western
Indian Ocean actors three are among
the ten most fragile states in the world,
namely Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan.
8
Radical terrorist groups affiliated to
Al-Qa’ida and Daesh (also known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) are
also present in these countries. Maritime
terrorism is at least a latent threat, with
the latest incident taking place in 2002
– the attack on the MV Limburg off the
coast of Yemen.
9
The Western Indian Ocean is one
of the world’s most critical maritime
regions. It is home to some of the major
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International operations against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean are due to wind
down. Some major external navies will probably remain, but the region’s states will have
to adjust to their new role in managing the challenging security environment. In this
article, Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger examine the options for cooperation in
this volatile region.
trade and energy supply routes between
Europe, Asia and the Gulf. More than
42,000 ships transit through the region
annually.
10
Since 2008 there has been an
increasing naval presence in the regional
waters as a response to maritime
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Three
multilateral missions, the EU Naval
Force Somalia (Operation Atalanta),
NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and
the US-led Combined Maritime Forces
(CMF) are currently operating in the
region, along with independent navies
of, among others, Russia, China, India,
Japan and even Iran.
11
More than 30
naval vessels, supported by helicopters,
aircraft and support vessels, are present
in the region on any given day. With no
successful piracy attack reported since
May 2012, the debate about the future
of the international naval presence has
started.
12
The current mandates run
until the end of 2016, as does the UN
Security Council authorisation. NATO
has already decided that its mission off
the Somali coast will not be extended;
13
the future of the EU counter-piracy
engagement off Somalia will also be
decided soon.
14
With this in mind, it
is important to consider how the vast
maritime security challenges will be
handled if these naval operations end,
and whether the region has the capacity
to cope with piracy and other maritime
challenges on its own.
A continuation of the international
naval presence in the absence of a
tangible piracy threat, however, also
raises questions. Decision-makers will
need to ask how potential tensions
between naval actors can be managed
and coordinated if the counter-piracy
regime in the region is dismantled and
other forms of legitimisation are required
to replace the UN Security Council
mandate and the current counter-piracy
legitimation.
It seems likely that the engagement
of the international community, as
currently constructed, will not continue
after 2016. Yet the maritime security
challenges will remain, as does the risk
of a return of piracy. The region will
have to get serious about its future
maritime security architecture, whether
the international navies leave or stay.
In a recent survey of maritime security
cooperation in the region the authors
sought to identify the various proposals
aimed at building a future security
architecture for the Western Indian
Ocean. The result was a perplexing
number of no fewer than sixteen
strategies, agreements and initiatives
of relevance for maritime security in
the region.
15
These aim at strengthening
regional capacities for maritime
security, tackling the problem of illegal
fishing, addressing human and drug
trafficking, and providing forums for
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INS Viraat escorting the Indian Navy's newly acquired aircraft carrier Vikramaditya during her delivery voyage. Courtesy of Indian Navy.
maritime security practitioners and naval
analysts.
There is a growing institutional
thicket to address the challenges in
the region’s waters. While each of the
emerging institutions is promising,
none appears fit on its own to handle
the maritime challenges of the region.
The tasks are manifold and overly
complex, and more than one institution
will certainly be required to undertake
them all. Yet, the relationships between
the current institutions are often unclear,
and diverging donor interests contribute
to a further proliferation. Sometimes
overlap and duplication might be
beneficial, to ensure that someone does
the job. Yet, the institutional landscape in
the Western Indian Ocean has reached a
degree of complexity which is inefficient.
Too many resources are invested in
building the diverse institutions and in
maintaining them. The structure will
not be able to deliver. Proliferation has
to stop, a clear vision and strategy about
how the region will manage maritime
security are required and regional
ownership is paramount in this process.
International assistance is a necessity, but
international actors would be wrong to
think they can dictate the terms of the
architecture; instead they should sign
up to the maritime business plan that
the region provides. In drafting this plan,
a number of principles will have to be
considered.
Maritime Security Dynamics in
the Western Indian Ocean
Actors in the region have very different
capacities and require different security
assurances.
16
India and South Africa
are the only states with operational
blue-water navies. They are not only
geostrategic and economic power
houses, but, together with Kenya,
Pakistan and Iran, are also de facto
veto-players. Their strategic leadership
will be required and their respective
interests need to be balanced. For Small
Island Developing States, such as the
Seychelles and the Maldives, maritime
security is at the heart of their national
interests. Small states have a great
potential to act as honest brokers and
intellectual leaders that set the agenda
for innovative maritime security thinking.
The Seychelles has already started to
assume this role with its blue economy
campaign.
17
Fragile states, notably
Somalia and Yemen, are the source of
many maritime security challenges.
They not only require a different set
of capacity-building efforts, but it will
also be more difficult to convince them
that maritime security is one of their
top priorities, considering the difficult
development and security challenges that
they face on land.
The region has a common
pre-colonial history of maritime trade. For
more than 1,000 years African, Asian and
Arab communities have been engaged in
trade and commerce across the Western
Indian Ocean.
18
These regional exchange
networks have facilitated the emergence
of a cosmopolitan ‘dhow culture’ among
littoral societies, which dominated the
region for centuries. The contemporary
regional identity is, however, weak, and
there is little experience of political
cooperation between the African and
Asian shores. Long-term state rivalries
and disputed boundaries complicate
the picture. Whether it is the rivalry
between India and Pakistan or Kenya
and Tanzania,
19
border disputes between
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Somalia and Kenya,
20
or the contested
ownership of islands between Mauritius,
Madagascar and the UK,
21
significant
efforts of trust- and confidence-building
will be required. New regional thinking,
the appreciation of a shared pre-colonial
history and recognition of the common
interest in ensuring maritime security will
be productive starting points.
Maritime security has a significant
economic dimension.
22
As was
emphasised in the UN Sustainable
Development Goals, the maritime
domain is a key source for regional
economic development.
23
It has been
estimated that the regional blue economy
in the Western Indian Ocean is worth
$22 billion, half of which – $11 billion –
comes from tourism. Mining and energy,
and agriculture and forestry contribute
15 and 20 per cent respectively to the
blue economy, and fishing is worth
more than $68 million.
24
High levels of
maritime insecurity have detrimental
effects on regional economic activities,
particularly in the trade, tourism, fishery,
and oil and gas sectors. As the World
Bank documented, Somali piracy cost the
global economy $18 billion per year, led
to a 23 per cent slump in regional fishery
exports and a 6.5 per cent fall in tourist
arrivals.
25
Also, the vast mineral and fossil
resources of the regional waters cannot
be exploited without a sufficient level of
maritime security.
Large parts of the regional coastal
population are, moreover, dependent
on fish as a source of nutrition. Fishery
and environmental crimes directly
threaten their food security. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for
instance, estimates that the livelihoods
of more than 2 million Tanzanians
are linked to various fisheries-related
activities, including boat building, fish
processing and fishery sales.
26
The causal
relationship between piracy and illegal
High levels of maritime
insecurity have
detrimental effects
on regional economic
activities
fishing is contested,
27
but the rise of
Somali piracy in 2008 demonstrated
how serious this issue is: illegal fishing
activities gave locals the motive and the
justification to attack ships under the
pretext of protecting their livelihoods
against exploitation.
28
Ignoring the needs
of the coastal population facilitates
a culture of crime and might lead to
their radicalisation. Maritime security
is therefore a pivotal economic and
development issue and there are direct
links between maritime security and the
blue economy.
29
As external actors and navies are
preparing to leave the Western Indian
Ocean the region can no longer rely on
them to protect its maritime domain.
What is required is a sustainable
approach that builds on and strengthens
regional capacities for maritime security
in the Western Indian Ocean. The
littoral states, in or adjacent to the
region, currently do not have sufficient
capacity to monitor and protect its vast
maritime domain. The average exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of the littoral states
is 667,104 km
2
, and their combined EEZ
extends over 11 million km
2
.
30
The EEZs
of island states such as the Maldives,
Comoros and the Seychelles is larger
than their land territories; coastal states
such as India, South Africa and Somalia
also have very significant EEZs. A few
states, in particular India, Iran, Pakistan
and South Africa, have capable navies,
but the majority of regional forces are
unable to protect fishing, intercept
suspicious vessels or combat illicit
trafficking in their EEZs. With an EEZ of
1.3 million km
2
, the Seychelles has the
second largest EEZ of any state in or
bordering the Western Indian Ocean
after India, but its naval force has only
200 officers and nine ships to patrol and
monitor this area.
31
Maritime security remains elusive
if regional capabilities continue to be
weak and underdeveloped. Nevertheless,
more military capabilities are not
necessarily the solution. While navies
play a key role in maritime security,
coastguards and other law enforcement
agencies are equally vital. Information
sharing, the coordination of operations
and appropriate legal regulations are
more important for improving the
situation than investment in high-end
naval capabilities. Maritime security is
a transnational problem. The pooling
of regional resources and capabilities,
and jointly coordinated operations are
essential. This requires cooperation and
the development of strong institutions
and instruments.
The weakness of regional navies and
maritime law enforcement institutions
is not the only problem facing the
Western Indian Ocean. Another problem
is the continued militarisation of the
region’s maritime domain. Reducing or
terminating the international counter-
piracy missions does not mean that
external actors will completely withdraw
their naval forces from the region. On
the contrary, it is increasingly apparent
that the international navies did not
only come to fight pirates, but also to
build up a strategic presence in the
region.
32
This is most obvious in the case
of China, which has greatly expanded its
operational experience and capabilities in
the region.
33
Counter-piracy operations
gave not only China, but a wider range of
navies, including from Japan and Korea,
the opportunity to exercise long-term
overseas deployments. China and Japan
have both opened their first overseas
naval bases in the port of Djibouti.
34
India
has long seen the Indian Ocean as its
‘backyard’ and is currently strengthening
its military and security cooperation
with regional states and islands.
35
Britain
and France, former colonial powers
in the Western Indian Ocean, have
long maintained military bases and
naval forces in the region. The US Navy
continues to lead a multinational naval
mission to fight terrorism in the region.
It has naval bases in Djibouti and Bahrain
as well as a naval support facility on the
island of Diego Garcia. Andrew S Erickson
et al. suggest that these bases are part
of an overall US strategy ‘to establish a
flexible and enduring presence within a
critical and contested space’.
36
Therefore, even as the international
counter-piracy engagement is being
scaled back, major naval powers will
Maritime security is a
transnational problem
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maintain, and maybe even expand,
their strategic presence in the region.
The continued militarisation of the
Western Indian Ocean, however, carries
risks and unintended consequences for
regional peace and security. It is unlikely
that we will see an escalation akin to
the situation in the South China Sea.
37
However, tensions and smaller disputes
are unavoidable if the region continues
to develop into a global centre for
geo-strategic competition. Tensions
between China, India and the US
have already surfaced. Some analysts
thus worry that these rivalries, and
the continued militarisation of the
region, will hinder cooperation and the
establishment of an effective maritime
security structure in the Western Indian
Ocean.
38
The naval presence in the region
is currently managed through the
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
(SHADE) mechanism, a regular forum in
which navies coordinate their activities
and share intentions, strategies and
tactics.
39
All naval powers, including
India and China, participate in SHADE
meetings, which are held in Bahrain
and are co-chaired on a rotational basis
by one of the ‘big three’ naval missions
(Atalanta, Ocean Shield and CMF). SHADE
is, however, a counter-piracy forum –
navies cooperate because they share a
common enemy. With recent absence
of piracy attack, the authority of SHADE
has already started to erode. In a post-
2016 environment, when the counter-
piracy operations come to an end, but
the navies stay, it is likely that SHADE will
cease to exist. It is not yet clear who will
then manage the tensions, coordinate
naval activities and ensure checks and
balances.
Significant efforts
will be required to
transfer the current
situation into an
effective, efficient and
sustainable maritime
security architecture
Elements of a Maritime Security
Architecture in the Western
Indian Ocean
Significant efforts will be required to
transfer the current situation into an
effective, efficient and sustainable
maritime security architecture. The
architecture will have to manage
interstate tensions between regional as
well as international actors and it will
have to build a culture of cooperation to
jointly address transnational maritime
threats. Yet, it will also require formats for
technical coordination, capacity-building
and sharing lessons learned within the
region. It is useful to consider the building
blocks for such an architecture.
First, a high-level official political
forum is required to provide strategic
guidance, ensure ongoing trust-
and confidence-building and keep
international navies in check. So far, these
tasks have been provided by the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(CGPCS).
40
The CGPCS is an inclusive
mechanism in which almost all the
littoral states participate. It is, however,
primarily driven by the security concerns
of the international actors and does not
address issues beyond the immediate
fight against pirates. Yet there are existing
institutions in the region which might
be able to perform the required role
and take over from the CGPCS such as
the 1972 UN Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean or the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA).
The Ad Hoc Committee was
established to act as the guardian of
Indian Ocean security and drive forward
the vision of an Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace, an idea the UN General Assembly
adopted in 1971.
41
The group, which
was born during the Cold War, lost
traction in the 1990s but has recently
experienced a renaissance under the
chairmanship of Sri Lanka.
42
Its 455
th
formal meeting took place in 2013 and
was attended by 43 states and three
observers, including regional countries as
well as external maritime states such as
Germany, Norway and Russia. Originally
concerned about interstate rivalry and
nuclear proliferation,
43
more recently
the committee has turned to discuss
non-traditional security challenges as
well, in particular maritime piracy but
also climate change. The committee
actively encourages the permanent
members of the UN Security Council
to participate and to contribute to its
work to enhance regional peace and
security.
44
IORA was founded in 1997 to
promote regional cooperation.
45
Headquartered inMauritius, it is primarily
an economic community interested
in trade and commerce.
46
Yet IORA
has started to discuss security as well
and it is considering the development
of a maritime security strategy.
47
The
strategy would focus on maritime
capacity-building and cooperation to
enhance maritime safety and security.
It would also promote competitive and
innovative maritime industries as well as
a sustainable blue economy. The Indian
Ocean Dialogue, which took place in India
in September 2015, dealt with issues
such as ‘Maritime Security and Defense
Cooperation’,
48
and ‘The Blue Economy
as a Driver of Economic Growth’;
49
and
the IORA Blue Economy Core Group,
which held a workshop in May 2015,
discussed the promotion of fisheries and
aquaculture as well as maritime safety
and security cooperation.
50
Both the UN committee and IORA
are currently marginal mechanisms in the
regional security architecture, and much
work would be needed to turn them into
more effective and efficient forums for
the development of maritime security
policies. However, they both provide the
institutional links and the organisational
skeleton to fulfill this function. The UN
committee seems the right forum for
ensuring a high-level dialogue and, given
its links to the UN Security Council and
the General Assembly, would be an
appropriate place for keeping an eye on
the international naval presence. IORA, on
the other hand, is anchored in the region
and therefore seems better equipped to
organise strategy on the ground and to
translate plans into action. The problem,
A high-level official
political forum is
required to provide
strategic guidance
RUSI 161_5 Text.indd 49 24/11/2016 11:35:30
pIRATES, DRuGS AnD nAvIES
RUSI JOURNAL OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2016
however, is that they both deal with the
wider Indian Ocean and are therefore
driven by many diverging interests and
agendas. As a result, it might be necessary
either to adapt these two institutions or
to design new ones in order to ensure
focus on the Western Indian Ocean.
Second, institutions will be required
to handle maritime security operations
– that is, the coordination of law
enforcement operations, the sharing
of best practices, the organisation of
training and capacity-building, as well
as information sharing and maritime
domain awareness. Many of these tasks
are in the hands of international actors.
Yet, a number of regional institutions
have been built that intend to perform
them.
51
This includes those run under the
multilateral counter-piracy agreement,
the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC),
under the EU’s Programme to Promote
Regional Maritime Security in the Eastern
and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean Region
(known as MASE), or the Indian Ocean
Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC)
organised by the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC). All three are heavily
dependent on donor interests. The
DCoC and MASE are also geographically
limited. They focus on Eastern Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula and do not include
the states further to the east (Sri Lanka,
India, Pakistan and Iran). At present, the
three projects compete with each other
over which will become the central
coordination mechanism for capacity-
building. It could be argued that, given
the weak capacities in the region, more
is better than less. However, in the long
run, this would be counterproductive and
ineffective. The region will be better off
by betting on one of the mechanisms and
reform it correspondingly (for example,
by including further actors). Alternatively,
the mechanism could be merged by
integrating elements of the DCoC, MASE
and IOFMC. This will require a strong
initiative led by regional actors, given that
donor interests and funding structures
limit what can be done.
52
The alternative
is to create a new and regionally owned
institution. This is perhaps a less
favourable option, since initially it would
create further institutions.
Third, a maritime security
architecture requires informal
coordination and strategic exchange
among operatives, strategists and
academics. Joint discussions and a
sustained regional dialogue on maritime
security are needed. This is perhaps the
area where the Western Indian Ocean
states have the least to worry about. With
conference formats such as the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium and its working
groups, the UAE annual counter-piracy
conference and Sri Lanka’s Galle Dialogue
International Maritime Conference, a
blossoming informal environment has
emerged in the region. These formats
tend to be costly, but have high symbolic
value.
53
They strengthen a culture of trust
and build confidence and transnational
interpersonal networks.
54
Moreover, it
is in these formats that the region will
be able to start to exchange ideas and
develop a strategy for its future maritime
security architecture.
Towards a Western Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace and Prosperity
A Western Indian Ocean zone of peace
and prosperity is in everyone’s interest.
Littoral states with a stake in the region,
together with international actors,
will have to get serious about how a
maritime security architecture can be
built. Piracy off the coast of Somalia is
currently at a low ebb, but the levels
of maritime insecurity in the region’s
territorial waters and high seas remain
high. The risk of piracy persists, illegal
fishing and trafficking have increased, and
a continuing naval build-up could create
new security tensions in the future. As
counter-piracy missions wind down,
maritime security must not slip off the
regional radar. The states in and around
the Western Indian Ocean are at an
important crossroads. A stable maritime
domain is crucial to secure world trade,
to harness the development potentials
of the blue economy and to protect
local livelihoods. The region needs a
new security architecture to guarantee
peace and security after 2016. The
thicket of maritime security institutions
that has developed in the region since
2008 provides some building blocks. Yet,
it is overly complex and often driven by
international actors, rather than being
regionally owned. Regional actors will
need to get into the driver’s seat and
start to develop their own regional vision,
coming up with a strategic plan for how
to transfer the current landscape into
an efficient, effective and sustainable
infrastructure. A Western Indian Ocean
zone of peace and prosperity is perhaps
closer than it will ever be. It is up to the
region, in dialogue with its international
partners, to make this happen.
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